Kimmel

WAS ADMIRAL KIMMEL REALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK?

One of the controversies regarding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was who was culpable for the raid. At the time, the senior naval commander on the base, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and his army counterpart, General Walter C. Short, took the fall for the attack and were subsequently sacked, but since then others have asked if this was fair. After all, they were simply doing the best they could and were working without the latest intelligence information, so many have maintained that they were unfairly singled out while others got a pass on the entire debacle. But is this truly the case? Where Kimmel and Short ultimately responsible for the sorry state of readiness in Hawaii that tragic Sunday morning, or were they the fall guys for the failings of more senior commanders and, perhaps, even the president himself?

While this debate will probably never be entirely settled, in the hindsight of history it is possible to make a few observations. It is apparent that some of the fault does lie with the White House and, especially, with the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, whose responsibility it was to keep his on-scene commanders abreast of the situation. He knew the political situation was deteriorating and that military action by the Japanese was a very real possibility if negotiations failed, so he needed to be more proactive in his approach to the situation. Clearly, Pacific commanders should have been told to be on some level of alert days or even weeks before the attack, which doesn't seem to have happened. (Apparently, some warnings were issued, but they lacked the sort of specific details commanders need to take action. It's like today when intelligence reports indicate that a terrorist attack is imminent, but no one has any idea where or when it might happen. It's hard to know specifically what to do if a warning is too vague.) So some of the blame must, rightfully, lie with Washington for not taking the potential for an attack more seriously.

But what of Kimmel and Short, then? Does that let them off the hook? Not at all. Kimmel and Short were veteran military officers with decades of experience between them who should have recognized that a Japanese attack was a real possibility and, further, that Hawaii was a likely target if it did—especially once the Pacific fleet was transferred from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor. Placing the fleet that close to Japanese interests should have been seen as a provocative act—a fact that neither man seemed to appreciate, at least to the fullest extent. Further, they knew that intelligence had lost track of the Japanese carriers, which should have been perceived as an ominous sign rather than being dismissed as an intelligence oversight. Additionally, they knew that a successful mock air attacks had been carried out on military installations on Oahu by American carriers during war games carried out in the 1920s and 1930s, so they knew such an attack was feasible. Taken together then—Pearl Harbor's extended position, the knowledge that war with Japan was a growing possibility, the realization that no one knew were much of the Japanese fleet was, and the fact that mock air attacks had been successfully carried out in the past—should have been enough warning.

I recognize that, technically, this was peacetime and so the American military may not yet have developed the proper mindset where national defense was concerned, but this is merely an excuse. While it's true that the United States was not yet at war (though the navy's battles with U-Boats in the Atlantic could be considered a type of "proxy war"), the world was a very dangerous place. War had been raging in Europe for over two years by this time, Russia was on the verge of collapsing in the face of the German juggernaut, and Tokyo had just sealed an alliance with Berlin that should have set off warning bells all over Washington. To still be in the mindset that America was safe behind its ocean boundaries was naïve and a recipe for disaster that men as experienced as Kimmel and Short should have seen through. Had either man taken the attitude that war with Japan wasn't a question of if but of when, much bloodshed and damage could have been avoided at Pearl Harbor. Unfortunately, neither man had been in combat before so perhaps they didn't appreciate how dangerous the situation was, but that is still no excuse.

So what could Kimmel and Short have done that might've made a difference? For General Short, whose aircraft were responsible for defending the fleet from air attack, he should've dispersed his aircraft rather than had them concentrated on the edge of the runways, where they were easy targets. (This was done in order to prevent sabotage from the Japanese immigrants on the island.) He could also have kept them fueled and armed, and perhaps even kept a few planes in standby at dawn just in case they were needed. Further, he was in charge of the island's only radar installation, which should have been manned 24/7 rather than just for a few hours each morning by a generally inexperienced crew. (In fact, the inbound Japanese were detected by this installation on the morning of December 7th but were dismissed by a junior duty officer as an inbound flight of B-17s from California. Protocols should have been put in place in which any contact was to be reported to a senior officer—if not to Short himself—in such an event. Had that been the case, the U.S. would have had more than an hours notice of Japan's intentions.)

As for Kimmel, he could've had his anchored battleships maintain a higher state of readiness while at anchor. One of the reasons several of the battleships sank so quickly was because numerous hatches were left open below decks in anticipation of admiral's inspections the next day. As a result, several ships (including the battleship Oklahoma) capsized within minutes when torpedoes tore huge holes in their sides and they quickly flooded. Had he ordered that all ships maintain a higher state of watertight integrity, including having most below decks hatches secured, it's likely none of them would have capsized or sank as quickly. (There would have still been considerable damage, of course, but capsized ships are much more difficult to salvage than those that sink upright. Had the Oklahoma sank on an even keel, it likely would have been salvaged along with most of the other battleships that sank that day.) Further, he could have instructed each ship's captain to ensure that ammo lockers were left unlocked (many were locked at the time of the attack and had to be broken open by gun crews) and easily accessible and that each ship keep at least one boiler lit in case of a sortie order. Finally, he could have insisted that torpedo netting (a wire mesh strung outboard of anchored ships designed to catch torpedoes before they can reach their target) be affixed to all outboard vessels. (The reason this wasn't done is because it is a time-consuming process. Additionally, it would interfere with a ship trying to exit the harbor quickly, but the payoff is that the encumbered ship would at least be spared torpedo hits, which tend to be more destructive to a vessel than bomb strikes.) Had these few and relatively minor steps been taken, it's conceivable the attack would have done less overall damage and the U.S. response would've been quicker and more effective. Another point that needs to be considered is that reconnaissance around Oahu was minimal, especially on weekends (when the fleet effectively went "on vacation.") Had Kimmel seen to it that a few destroyers remained on patrol (especially north of the island from where an attack was most likely to come from) or had at least some of the several dozen PBY flying boats stationed on the island on aerial patrol—at least during the most vulnerable morning hours—that might well have made all the difference in the world. As it was, the harbor was left blind at a time when it needed to see its clearest.

In 1998, in a fit of revisionist finger-pointing and after considerable lobbying by Kimmel's family (the admiral himself having passed away in 1968) congress passed a non-binding resolution that effectively absolved both Kimmel and Short of responsibility for the disastrous attack on Hawaii in 1941, but in a rare instance of executive wisdom, President Clinton refused to sign it (as have his successors). It's not a matter of punishing people, but of demonstrating that with great responsibility comes great consequences if one doesn't fulfill those responsibilities adequately. We are quick to honor our military leaders when they succeed, but success means little if it in not contrasted against the prospect of failure. To hold Kimmel and Short largely responsible for the disaster that was December 7th is not a statement about them as men or officers, but simply an acknowledgement that they were not up to the task at hand. After all, had they been more vigilant and sounded the alarm in time, they would have been heralded as heroes today; it's only right, then, that failing to take the actions required to reduce the carnage make them scapegoats. Their families may not like it, but that's just the cold, hard facts of life.

ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL
Pacific Fleet Commander on December 7, 1941.

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